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Notes
AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court:
Insurers Liable for Environmental
Response Costs
I. INTRODUCTION
Pervasive, devastating pollution of our natural resources is a cru-
cial and life-threatening problem.' Cleanup is essential, but the cost
is staggering. Thus, who cleans up, when and how, and who pays
are critical questions. Many answers have been supplied in state and
federal statutes, most notably the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) .
Many companies identified by the government as parties responsi-
ble for past hazardous waste releases were insured under Com-
prehensive General Liability (CGL) policies. When ordered to
1. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency estimates the United States
produces 280 million metric tons of hazardous waste each year. Chappie, D'Angelo,
Johnson, Kimmel, Mahoney, Minis, Ware, Pollution Control 20 Years After Earth Day:
A Retrospective on Federal Environmental Programs, 21 ENVTL. REP. 123, 126 (1990)
[hereinafter Federal Environmental Programs]. While 87 percent of the nation's sewage
systems now have secondary treatment, San Diego and Los Angeles are among large
coastal cities without secondary sewage treatment systems. Id. at 127.
2. EPA estimated the average cost of cleanup per site at $8.1 million. OFFCE OF
EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
EXTENT OF THE HAZARDOUS RELEASE PROBLEM AND FUTURE FUNDING NEEDS,
CERCLA 301 (A) (1) (C) STUDY 4-3 (1984). According to a project director of the
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, more than $10 billion of federal, state
and private industry money has been spent on Superfund site cleanup in the 1980s. Fed-
eral Environmental Programs, supra note 1, at 127.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
4. The standardized CGL insurance contract has been used by business insurers
since the 1880s. The industry-wide standard form policy, issued in 1940, was revised in
reimburse the government for costs of monitoring and cleanup of
hazardous waste sites or to clean sites themselves, these companies
filed insurance claims. Insurers refused to pay, arguing that the poli-
cies did not cover equitable, as opposed to legal relief, and that resti-
tution and mitigation did not qualify as "damages."0'
In November 1990, California became the sixth state whose high-
est court decided whether environmental response costs and costs of
compliance with injunctions are covered as damages under CGL pol-
icies.7 In AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court," the California Supreme
Court unanimously held that the standard-form CGL policies issued
to the real party in interest, FMC Corporation (FMC), "cover the
costs of reimbursing government agencies and complying with in-
junctions ordering cleanup under CERCLA and similar statutes."
This Note will examine the California Supreme Court's decision
in AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court covering the "new" environmental
liability. Section II will examine the state of the law nationwide and
in California at the time of the decision. Section III will examine the
facts of AIU and the court's opinion. Section IV will analyze the
impact and implications of the decision.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Environmental Response Costs Under CERCLA
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)' ° to respond to
pollution caused by hazardous waste, an increasingly evident na-
tional disaster. Among other things, CERCLA imposes retroactive
strict liability on parties who have improperly released hazardous
wastes in 'violation of federal and state statutes."
Responsible parties are liable, but cleanup costs are astronomi-
cal.' 2 Congress created the Hazardous Substance Superfund to en-
1943, 1955, 1966 and 1973. GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE - 1973 REVISIONS 3 (F.
Bardenwerper & D. Hirsch eds. 1974) [hereinafter F. Bardenwerper & D. Hirsch].
5. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco is a typical decision, in which the court
agreed with the insurer's claim of this narrow, technical definition of damages. 822 F.2d
1348 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988).
6. The first five states are Washington, North Carolina, Maine, Minnesota and
Massachusetts. The highest court of each of these states decided this issue between Janu-
ary and June, 1990. Only Maine decided in favor of the insurer. See infra notes 29 and
30 and accompanying text.
7. AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 807, 799 P.2d 1253, 274 Cal. Rptr.
820 (1990).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 814, 799 P.2d at 1259, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
10. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (1988)).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
12. See supra note 2.
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sure that funds are available to investigate hazardous waste sites
and, if necessary, to initiate cleanup.'" If the government incurs costs
of responding to assessment and cleanup of hazardous waste sites, it
sues the responsible parties for reimbursement. 14 Alternatively,
under CERCLA the government can request voluntary compliance
or issue injunctions against responsible parties, requiring them to
clean sites and to mitigate damages.'"
Superfund has limited resources which will not even begin to cover
all the necessary cleanup costs. Companies responsible for their own
cleanup or for reimbursing the government have sought coverage
from their Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) insurance poli-
cies. CGL policies are widely used standard-form policies. 16 When
insurers refuse to cover policy holders' claims for pollution response
costs, the issue is whether such costs are "damages" under the
policies. 7
B. Insurers' Liability: Judicial Response Nationwide
While a few courts were asked in the 1970s to interpret environ-
mental cleanup as damages,' 8 the first court holding that damages
under CGL policy language covered government-ordered cleanup
was a 1983 Michigan court of appeals in United States Aviex Co. v.
Travelers Insurance Co.'" Three years later, in Maryland Casualty
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1988). Superfund has up to $8.5 billion available for the
five-year period beginning October 17, 1986. Id.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9604.
15. Id.
16. AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 807, 815, 823 n.9, 799 P.2d 1253,
1259, 1265 n.9, 274 Cal. Rptr. 820, 826, 832 n.9 (1990).
17. Coverage provisions in FMC's sixty plus primary and excess policies were
adopted verbatim from standard CGL policies. All policies cover FMC for one of the
following: "'all sums which [FMC] shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of ... property damage to which this policy applies,'" for "'all sums which
[FMC] shall become obligated to pay by reason of the liability... imposed upon [FMC]
by law ... for damages on account of ... property damage . . . '" or for "'all sums
which [FMC] shall be obligated to pay by reason of the liability. . .imposed upon
[FMC] by law ... for damages, direct or consequential and expenses, all as more fully
defined by the term 'ultimate not loss' on account of.. . property damages ... .'" Id. at
814-15, 799 P.2d at 1259, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
18. See, e.g., Lansco, Inc. v. Dep't of Envl. Protection, 138 N.J. Super. 275, 350
A.2d 520 (1975) (coverage under CGL policy extended to statutory liability for damages
recoverable by the state for damage caused by oil spill from insured's property), aft'd,
145 N.J. Super. 433, 368 A.2d 363 (1976), cert. denied, 73 N.J. 57, 372 A.2d 322
(1977); Chemical Applications Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 425 F. Supp. 777 (D. Mass.
1977)(insured who was responsible for oil spill cleanup could be reimbursed by insurer
for insured's own cleanup work rather than waiting for more costly work by government).
19. 125 Mich. App. 579, 336 N.W.2d 838 (1983).
Co. v. Armco,2 ° the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit adopted
a narrow, technical definition of insurance damages to exclude cover-
age of environmental response costs. 21 In Armco, the Fourth Circuit
maintained the distinction between damages at law and at equity.22
The reasonable insured, the court asserted, would infer that a dam-
ages policy would not cover equitable remedies of restitution and in-
junction. 23 U.S. Aviex and Armco established the ends of the spec-
trum, with far more courts following the U.S. Aviex pro-coverage
stance.
In fact, the California Supreme Court noted in AIU that it had
found only one prior appellate court decision which held that reim-
bursement of response costs was not damages under CGL policies.2 4
Likewise, the court found only one appellate decision concluding, in
dictum, that injunctive relief was not covered under CGL policies 2,
Federal courts have not been as consistent. Armco and an Eighth
Circuit decision 28 have dominated the narrow view of damages that
excludes coverage by CGL policies. Other federal courts have inter-
preted state law to include remediation and injunctive relief as
damages.
It was a New Jersey court that first relied extensively on principles
of insurance policy interpretation when construing the term "dam-
ages" in CGL policies.28 All five of the highest state courts, includ-
ing California, that have decided the CGL insurance issue in favor
of coverage relied on established principles 29 of contract interpreta-
tion.30 Only one state supreme court has decided in favor of the in-
surer,31 relying on the technical interpretations of Armco 32 and
20. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987).
21. Id. at 1352. ,
22. Id. at 1352-53.
23. Id. at 1352.
24. AIU, 51 Cal. 3d at 819, 799 P.2d at 1262, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 829 (citing Bras-
well v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 300 N.C. 338, 387 S.E.2d 707 (1989)).
25. AIU, 51 Cal. 3d at 820, 799 P.2d at 1263, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 830 (citing CPS
Chem. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 222 N.J. Super. 175, 536 A.2d 311 (1988)).
26. Continental Ins. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977
(8th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter NEPACCO].
27. See, e.g., Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200 (2d
Cir. 1989); Chesapeake Utils. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 704 F. Supp. 551
(D. Del. 1988); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp.
1359 (D. Del. 1987).
28. Broadwell Realty Servs. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y., 218 N.J. Super.
516, 528 A.2d 76 (1987).
29. E.g., see infra note 70.
30. Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869, 784 P.2d 507
(1990); Spangler Const. v. Industrial Crankshaft & Engr. Co., 326 N.C. 133, 388 S.E.2d
557 (1990); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175
(1990); Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 407 Mass. 689, 555
N.E.2d 576 (1990); AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 807, 799 P.2d 1253, 274
Cal. Rptr. 820 (1990).
31. Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. v. Marios, 573 A.2d 16 (1990).
32. 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987).
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NEPACCO. 33
C. CGL Coverage in California
Prior to the California Supreme Court decision in AIU, California
courts of appeal were split on the issue, with one very broad, pro-
coverage decision3 4 and the court of appeal's very narrow interpreta-
tion in AIU.3s Interestingly, it was a federal district court in 1988
that accurately predicted the California Supreme Court's decision. "
In Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,s7 the district
court emphasized the importance of applying state law rather than
basing the decision on federal statutory language.38 The Intel court
applied California contract interpretation principles and case law.39
However, Intel went one step further and considered public policy a
reason to recognize coverage of response costs.4 0 Both federal and
state interests in effecting prompt, efficient cleanup are frustrated,
according to Intel, without the essential cooperation of responsible
33. 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988).
34. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 216, 257 Cal.
Rptr. 621 (1989).
35. AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1219, 262 Cal. Rptr. 182
(1989).
36. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. Cal.
1988).
This Court concludes that the California Supreme Court would hold that
costs incurred by an insured in investigating and cleaning upa pollution (in par-
ticular, hazardous waste) that is damaging public property and posing an es-
tablished threat to public health are covered by the terms of a comprehensive
general liability policy.
Id. at 1192.
37. 692 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
38. Id. at 1187.
39. The Intel court relied heavily on California's doctrine of mitigation expressed
in Globe Indem. Co. v. State of California, 43 Cal. App. 3d 745, 118 Cal. Rptr. 75
(1974). In Globe Indemnity, a California court of appeal examined whether an insured's
expenses, incurred to mitigate damage by fire to third parties' property, covered under a
CGL policy. The court held the insured was covered for prevention of damage for which
coverage was provided if the damage was allowed to occur. Id. at 751-52, 118 Cal. Rptr.
at 79-80.
The California Insurance Code has a similar provision: "An insurer is liable: ... (b) If
a loss is caused by efforts to rescue the thing insured from a peril insured against." CAL.
INS. CODE § 531 (West 1972).
Thus, the insurance policy exclusion for "owned property" probably will not survive
after the AIU decision. The insurer appears to be liable for the cost of damage to the
insured's own land if the damage threatens to spread to another's property.
40. Intel, 692 F. Supp. at 1193.
parties.4' The government simply lacks the resources to accomplish
the monumental task without industry cooperation.42 Denial of insur-
ance coverage for costs of complying with cleanup, the Intel court
said, would deter compliance and mitigation of damages until re-
sponsible parties are sued for reimbursement of agencies' cleanup
expenses.4 3
The same public policy issue is raised in the two conflicting Cali-
fornia courts of appeal cases. While the Aerojet decision is based on
contract interpretation and California's mitigation of damages doc-
trine, the court says coverage "is also supported by sound public pol-
icy."44 Because coverage would encourage companies in earlier, more
cooperative cleanup, "in the long run insurance coverage would seem
to enhance the quality of environmental protection."'45 FMC argued
the same policy to the court of appeal in AIU, but that court de-
clined to "assume the role of legislators. 46
Likewise, the California Supreme Court declined to consider pub-
lic policy in its analysis. 47 However, the high court acknowledged the
same deterrence problem identified by the Intel and Aerojet courts
and cited with approval the "underlying rationale" of some courts'
decisions stated in terms of public policy.48
The California Supreme Court agreed to decide the issue of
whether standard-form comprehensive liability insurance policies
cover reimbursement of environmental response costs incurred by the
government or insureds' compliance with injunctions to remedy and
mitigate damages. Only five other states' highest courts had decided
the same issue - four in favor of coverage, one against.49 Within
five months, two California courts of appeal had reached opposite
conclusions based on their interpretations of the policies. 50
III. AIU INS. Co. V. SUPERIOR COURT
A. Facts
FMC allegedly contaminated seventy-nine hazardous waste dispo-
sal sites, surface water surrounding the sites, and groundwater and




44. Aerojet, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 237, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
45. Id.
46. AIU, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1237, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
47. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
48. AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 807, 840-41, 799 P.2d 1253, 1278,
274 Cal. Rptr. 820, 845. For cases, see infra note 95 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
51. AIU, 51 Cal. 3d at 815, 799 P.2d at 1260, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
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States and local administrative agencies filed suits against FMC for
statutory violations. 2 They sought two types of relief. First, the
agencies sought injunctions requiring FMC to halt disposal of haz-
ardous wastes. 53 Second, they sought reimbursement of response
costs for investigating, monitoring and initiating cleanup.5 4
FMC sought declaratory relief in Superior Court in Santa Clara
County to establish coverage for environmental response and
remediation costs under its more than sixty standard-form GCL in-
surance policies carried by several insurers. The trial court denied
the insurers' motion for summary adjudication, saying the CGL poli-
cies should be interpreted nontechnically, according to established
principles of insurance interpretation.5 Thus, it construed environ-
mental cleanup costs, whether by injunction or by reimbursing gov-
ernment agencies, as "damages" or "ultimate net loss" under the
policies.56
The insurers requested a writ of mandate. The court of appeal
granted the writ and ordered the trial court to grant insurers' motion
for summary adjudication.5 7 The court of appeal noted that until re-
cent environmental suits, CGL policies were not expected to cover
costs their insureds incurred to comply with governmental police
power or respond to injunctions.5" Thus, the court reasoned, FMC
and its insurers could not have expected the coverage requested in
the instant suit.5 9 The court based its narrow, technical reading of
the policies on Armco6" and NEPACCO,61 decided in the Fourth and
52. Id. FMC allegedly violated CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988); Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988); the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (1988); and the California Hazardous Substance Account Act
(CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25300-25367 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991).
53. AIU, 51 Cal. 3d at 815-16, 799 P.2d at 1260, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 827. Injunctive
relief is available under all statutes on which the agencies sued: 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a)
(1988); 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1988); 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a)
(1988); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25358.3(a) (West 1984 & Supp. 1991).
54. AIU, 51 Cal. 3d at 816, 799 P.2d at 1260, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 827. Two statutes
authorize recovery of response costs. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988); and
the Hazardous Substance Account Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25360 (West
1984 & Supp. 1991).
55. AIU, 51 Cal. 3d at 817, 799 P.2d at 1261, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
56. Id.
57. AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1219, 1238, 262 Cal. Rptr.
182, 194 (1989).
58. Id. at 1223, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
59. Id.
60. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987). See
supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
61. Continental Ins. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977
Eighth Circuits.62
B. Opinion
The California Supreme Court unanimously reversed.63 Applying
ordinary rules of insurance policy construction, the court held that
the comprehensive liability policies covered FMC's costs to reim-
burse the government and to comply with injunctions under
CERCLA and other environmental statutes.64
Writing for the court, Chief Justice Lucas said the issue before
the court was not one of public policy.65 Because CERCLA and the
Hazardous Substance Account Act allow parties to insure against
the costs of relief those statutes authorize, Congress and the Califor-
nia Legislature already have considered and incorporated relevant-
public policy, according to the court.6 Thus, the court's task was to
find the answer to the coverage question in the language of the in-
surance policies.67 The court used a two-step analysis: (1) it deter-
mined what rules of insurance policy interpretation applied to this
suit under California law; and (2) it used the applicable rules to in-
terpret the CGL policies in question.68
In the first step of its analysis, the court examined statutory rules
of contract interpretation, enacted in California in 1872.69 Insurance
policies' plain, ordinary meaning is to be used to determine the par-
ties' mutual intention at the time they entered the contract.7 0 Envi-
(8th Cir. 1988). See supra text accompanying note 26.
62. AIU, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1227, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
63. AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 807, 814, 799 P.2d 1253, 1259,
274 Cal. Rptr. 820, 826 (1990).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 818, 799 P.2d at 1262, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
66. Id. The court continued:
Thus, because Congress and the Legislature already have made the relevant
public policy determinations, the issue before this Court is not whether CGL
policies may provide the coverage sought, but whether they do provide it ac-
cording to their terms. The answer is to be found solely in the language of the
policies, not in public policy considerations.
Id. (emphasis in original).
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (1988) and CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25364 (West 1984
& Supp. 1991).
67. AIU, 51 Cal. 3d at 818, 799 P.2d at 1262, 274 Cal. Rptr, at 829.
68. Id. at 818, 799 P.2d at 1261-62, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 828-29. The AIU court did
not consider exclusions contained in many of the policies. Id. at 814, 799 P.2d at 1259,
274 Cal. Rptr. at 826. Thus, exclusion clauses are beyond the scope of this Note. How-
ever, for a consideration of the inadequacy of traditional insurance policy interpretation
in asbestos litigation and a hint of tough decisions to come, see Note, Adjudicating As-
bestos Insurance Liability: Alternatives to Contract Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REV. 739
(1984).
69. Id. at 822, 799 P.2d at 1264, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 831 (citing CAL. CIv. CODE §
1644 (West 1985)).
70. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1636 (contract interpreted to give effect to mutual intentiorr
of the parties); § 1638 (language of a contract governs its interpretation); § 1639 (inten-
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ronmental cleanup imposed by federal and state law was a new lia-
bility, incurred since the policy was written. However, the court
pointed out that insurance policies are interpreted broadly, to protect
the insured's expectations.71 "The sole relevant inquiry in determin-
ing whether such types of liability are covered is whether, in view of
the reasonable expectations of the insured, policy language can be
interpreted to embrace the liability that may accrue under new stat-
utory schemes. ' ' T
Moreover, ambiguities in policy language usually are construed
against the insurer, who drafted the language. 73 Although FMC is a
sophisticated company not lacking in bargaining power, the court
had no evidence the policy provisions were negotiated or the lan-
guage specially drafted with both parties' involvement. 74 Thus, be-
cause the policies were standard-form, used throughout the country,
the court adhered to ordinary principles of insurance policy interpre-
tation and construed ambiguities against the insurers. 5
In the second part of its analysis, the court applied principles of
policy interpretation to FMC's policies to determine whether they
covered response costs requested by third parties. The policies had to
meet three requirements for coverage: (1) that FMC was "legally
obligated" to pay the costs; (2) that the legal obligation was for
"damages"; and (3) that the damages resulted from "damage to
property. '76
First, applying the plain meaning of the language, the court said
'legally obligated' covers injunctive relief and recovery of response
costs." '77 Conceding insurers' argument that response costs and in-
junctions can be considered equitable relief, the court pointed out
that California law rarely distinguishes between courts of law and
equity. An insured certainly would not make such a distinction in
tion of parties to written contract to be ascertained from the writing alone if possible); §
1641 (whole of a contract to be taken together to give effect to every part); § 1644
(words of a contract to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense); § 1649 (am-
biguous term to be interpreted in sense promisor believed promisee understood it at time
of contracting); § 1654 (in case of uncertainty, language of a contract to be interpreted
against party who caused the uncertainty) (West 1985).
71. AIU, 51 Cal. 3d at 822, 799 P.2d at 1264, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
72. Id. at 822 n.8, 799 P.2d at 1265 n.8, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 832 n.8.
73. Id. at 822, 799 P.2d at 1264, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 831 (citing CAL. CIv. CODE §
1654 (West 1985)).
74. AIU, 51 Cal. 3d at 823, 799 P.2d at 1265, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 824, 799 P.2d at 1266, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
77. Id. at 825, 799 P.2d at 1266, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
contemplating coverage. 8
Second, after extensive analysis, the court concluded that both re-
imbursement of government response costs and cost of compliance
with injunctions are "damages" under the CGL policies. The court
struck a middle ground between the highly technical definition of
damages the AIU court of appeals followed 7  and the very broad
view of Aerojet.80 A technical reading of insurance policies does not
comport with California law, which uses plain language to find an
insured's reasonable expectations. On the other hand, the court said
the Aerojet approach that "the insured may reasonably expect cover-
age for any sums expended"81 negated the phrase "as damages.""
Because the term damages was not defined in the policies, the
court looked to dictionary and statutory definitions. 83 The court then
applied the common elements of these definitions8 4 to determine if
the claimed relief constituted damages.85 First, the court considered
whether reimbursement of government agencies could be construed
as damages. Contamination of surface and groundwater in Califor-
nia constitutes detriment to a state interest.86 FMC's acts allegedly
caused the harm for which federal and state agencies incurred ex-
penses to investigate and initiate cleanup. Thus, the court reasoned,
reimbursing the government for expenses incurred because of FMC's
78. Id. Indeed, the court quoted from Aeroje: "It would come as an unexpected, if
not incomprehensible, shock to the insureds to discover that their insurance coverage was
being denied because the plaintiff chose to frame his complaint in equity rather than in
law." Aerojet-General Corp. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 216, 228, 257 Cal.
Rptr. 621, 628 (1989).
79. AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1219, 1235, 262 Cal. Rptr.
182, 186 (1989).
80. Aerojet, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 226, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 626-27.
81. Id. at 226, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 627 (emphasis added).
82. AIU, 51 Cal. 3d at 828, 799 P.2d at 1268, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
83. AIU, 51 Cal. 3d at 825-26, 799 P.2d at 1267, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 834. For
example, the Civil Code provides: "Every person who suffers detriment from the unlaw-
ful act or omission of another, may recover from the person at fault a compensation
therefor in money, which is called damages." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3281 (Deering 1984).
Dictionaries the court relied on define damages in two ways. The first method defines
damages as "the estimated reparation in money for detriment or injury sustained: com-
pensation or satisfaction imposed by law for a wrong or injury caused by a violation of a
legal right." WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 581 (3d ed. 1981). The sec-
ond method defines damages as "[a] pecuniary compensation or indemnity, which may
be recovered in the courts by any person who has suffered loss, detriment, or injury,
whether to his person, property, or rights, through the unlawful act or omission of an-
other." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 466 (4th ed. 1951).
84. "Each [definition] requires there to be 'compensation,' in 'money,' 'recovered'
by a party for 'loss' or 'detriment'...." AIU, 51 Cal. 3d at 826, 799 P.2d at 1267, 274
Cal. Rptr. at 834 (note omitted).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 829, 799 P.2d at 1269, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 836. The Water Code provides:
"All water within the State is the property of the people of the State, but the right to the
use of water may be acquired by appropriation in the manner provided by law." CAL.
WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971).
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harm to the environment is compensating the agencies for a loss they
suffered. Plain reading of FMC's insurance policies, therefore, per-
mits compensation for damages."7
The court rejected the insurers' three arguments to the contrary.
First, while CERCLA distinguishes between response costs and
damages to natural resources, the court deemed itself not bound by
federal statutory distinctions which did not exist at the time the par-
ties contracted for the policies and thus could not possibly have re-
flected the parties' intent.8s
Second, the court rejected the argument that reimbursing govern-
ment response costs is merely a cost of doing business. Loss or detri-
ment incurred for remediation and for mitigation of further harm is
compensable even though it is regulatory.89 However, the court
agreed that purely prophylactic measures to prevent future harm are
not covered by CGL policies, as costs of those measures are not oc-
casioned by actual damages. 90
Finally, insurers argued restitutive relief is inappropriate for insur-
ance coverage. The court distinguished between restitution for puni-
tive purposes, prohibited by the insurance code,9' and reimbursement
of response costs, which it did not construe in the narrow, punitive
sense.
92
87. AIU, 51 Cal. 3d at 829, 799 P.2d at 1269-70, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 836-37.
88. Id. at 831, 799 P.2d at 1271, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
89. Id. at 832, 799 P.2d at 1272, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 839. Also see supra note 39.
90. AIU, 51 Cal. 3d at 832, 799 P.2d at 1271, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 838. A prophylac-
tic measure is one aimed at prevention of future harm. For example, installing fire extin-
guishers is a purely prophylactic measure to prevent fire damage. Changing dumping
practices might be a prophylactic measure to prevent future pollution.
91. Id. at 837 n.15, 799 P.2d at 1275 n.15, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 842 n.15. The Insur-
ance Code provided: "No policy of insurance shall provide, or be construed to provide,
any coverage or indemnity for the payment of any fine, penalty, or restitution in any civil
or criminal action or proceeding .... ." CAL. INS. CODE § 533.5 (West 1988). However,
section 533.5 was amended, effective January 1, 1991, stating the legislature's intent in
enacting the section was "(b) Not to affect the existence, or nonexistence, of insurance
coverage, or the duty to defend in actions such as, but not limited to, actions brought by
any entity pursuant to Section 25360 of the Health and Safety Code . . . or any similar
federal law." CAL. INS. CODE § 533.5 (West 1991) [Historical & Statutory Notes].
Section 25360 of the Health and Safety Code allows the state to recover "[a]ny costs
incurred and payable from the state account or the Hazardous Substance Cleanup Fund
.... " CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25360(a) (West 1984 & Supp. 1991). Section
25364 permits "any agreement to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to the
agreement for any costs or expenditures under this chapter." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 25364 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991). Thus, reimbursement for response costs is not
a penalty for which insurance is forbidden by section 533.5 of the Insurance Code. Id.
92. AIU, 51 Cal. 3d at 836, 799 P.2d at 841-42, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 1274-75. The
court distinguishes Jaffe v. Cranford Ins. Co., 168 Cal. App. 3d 930, 935, 214 Cal. Rptr.
567, 571 (1985) (limiting restitution "to situations in which the defendant is required to
Next, the court applied the common definitions of damages to
costs of compliance with injunctions. Costs of injunctive relief do not
as clearly fit the definition of damages because they are not paid to
an aggrieved third party but to company employees. However, the
court refused to elevate form over substance by covering one remedy
but not the other.93 In the case of response to environmental harm,
the purpose both of reimbursing the government for cleanup and of
requiring a responsible party to address the harm is the same. The
only difference in effect is that the responsible party probably can
clean up less expensively and sooner than the government can. The
justices agreed with courts that had reasoned that the parties could
reasonably expect such costs to be considered damages. 94 Slipping
from its resolve not to examine policy concerns, the justices also
agreed with the rationale of courts that had argued public policy.95
Those courts argued that policy concerns required that costs of com-
pliance be viewed as damages to avoid constraining the choice of
cleanup means based on whether insurance would cover (or, con-
versely, causing coverage to be denied based on "mere fortuity" of
choice).96 Thus, the California Supreme Court said the policy lan-
guage was ambiguous as applied to costs incurred for injunctive re-
lief and must, therefore, be construed in favor of coverage.97
Finally, the court addressed the requirement that coverage be for
damages "because of property damage. '9 8 Contamination of the en-
vironment, the court said, is property damage. 9  This is true whether
the government's motivation in seeking relief is regulatory or propri-
etary and no matter who owns the polluted property.100
In California, as a matter of law, insurers are liable under CGL
policies for their insureds' obligations to reimburse the government
for environmental response costs and for costs of compliance with
injunctions ordering environmental cleanup. Costs of purely prophy-
restore to the plaintiff that which was wrongfully acquired"). Id.
93. AIU, 51 Cal. 3d at 840, 799 P.2d at 1277, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
94. Id. at 840, 799 P.2d at 1278, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 845. The court cited C.D.
Spangler Constr. Co. v. Industrial Crankshaft & Eng'r Co., 326 N.C. 133, 149-50, 388
S.E.2d 557, 565 (1990); Aerojet-General Corp. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 216,
228, 257 Cal. Rptr. 621, 628 (1989); Chesapeake Utils. Corp. v. American Home Assur-
ance, 704 F. Supp. 551, 559-60 (D. Del. 1988).
95. AIU, 51 Cal. 3d at 840-41, 799 P.2d at 1278, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 845. The
court cited Spangler, 326 N.C. at 150, 388 S.E.2d at 565; Intel Corp. v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co.,692 F. Supp. 1171, 1183, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Chemical Applica-
tions Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 425 F. Supp. 777, 778-79 (D. Mass. 1977); United States
Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins., 125 Mich. App. 579, 589-90, 336 N.W.2d 838, 843 (1983).
96. AIU, 51 Cal. 3d at 840, 799 P.2d at 1278, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
97. Id. at 841, 799 P.2d at 1278, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
98. Id. *at 824, 799 P.2d at 1266, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
99. Id. at 842, 799 P.2d at 1279, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
100. Id. at 842-43, 799 P.2d at 1279, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
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lactic measures are not covered. 1' 1
IV. ANALYSIS
The California Supreme Court stopped insurance companies' first
line of defense against million-dollar claims for environmental dam-
age with a "plain meaning" interpretation of Comprehensive Gen-
eral Liability insurance policies. The court's methodical, tenacious
adherence to well-established principles of contract interpretation
bodes well for all standard-form insurance policy holders.
The question is whether the court truly read the policies neutrally
or whether the court would expand its interpretation of liability in-
surance to include coverage even if policy language were changed to
be unambiguous. The most obvious way to answer the question, by
examining an interpretation by the court of policies worded to re-
move the ambiguities, is unlikely to be forthcoming. Coverage is vir-
tually unavailable for all types of liability for pollution and
cleanup.102 Thus, policy language now being interpreted by the
courts was written long before liability for pollution was an issue.103
Because liability under CERCLA is retroactive,0 4 often the policies
being interpreted were in effect at the time the alleged pollution oc-
curred but may not be currently in effect.
This Note, therefore, will explore the court's holding based, first,
on its own language, and, second, on the effect of its holding and the
policy considerations the court might have had in mind.
A. Plain Meaning Interpretation
In the problematic area of toxic waste and defiled waterways,
where feelings run high and fears and outrage are easily aroused, the
court said it refused to address the question of who pays for cleanup
from a public policy standpoint.10 5 The issue before it, the court in-
sisted, was not whether CGL policies were permitted to cover
cleanup costs, but whether they do provide the coverage. 0 6 The rele-
vant public policy determinations were made by Congress and the
101. Id. at 832, 799 P.2d at 1271, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
102. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 942, 944 & n.8 (1988) [hereinafter Environmental Liability].
103. F. Bardenwarper & D. Hirsch, supra note 4.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
105. AIU, 51 Cal. 3d at 818, 824 n.10, 799 P.2d at 1262, 1266 n.10, 274 Cal.
Rptr. at 829, 833 n.10. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
106. AIU, 51 Cal. 3d at 818, 799 P.2d at 1262, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
Legislature when they enacted CERCLA and the Hazardous Sub-
stance Account Act allowing parties to insure against the relief those
statutes afford.10 7 The court rejected insurers' public policy argu-
ment, based on Insurance Code section 533.5, on the same basis.108
The other five states whose highest courts have decided the issue1'0
also have addressed it from the contract interpretation rather than
public policy standpoint."10
In only one instance did the court waver in its resolve to leave
public policy to the legislature. Because costs for responsible parties
to do their own cleanup do not as easily fit a definition of damages as
does reimbursement of government expenses for cleanup, the court
considered the effect of a holding that insurance covers reimbursing
government response costs but not injunctive relief."' The court
couched its own finding that both are covered in policy interpreta-
tion, saying policy language is ambiguous, so it must be construed in
favor of coverage."12 However, the justices approved the rationale of
some courts who "stated this conclusion in terms of public policy."' 13
By firmly grounding its decision in codified precepts of contract
interpretation, the court left few, if any, doubts about interpretation
of standard-form insurance policies. Future litigants will not have
the "wiggle room" they might have had with a policy-based decision.
107. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 91.
109. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
110. The Washington court, for example, said:
It is important to note the absence of public policy in the construction of
insurance contracts. While this case implicitly presents a grave question of pol-
icy, namely who should bear the cost of polluting our environment, the task
presently before this court only requires us to construe the terms of the policies
under Washington law. Washington courts rarely invoke public policy to over-
ride express terms of an insurance policy.
Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869, 876 n.l, 784 P.2d 507,
510 n.1 (1990) (citations omitted).
111. AIU, 51 Cal. 3d at 838, 799 P.2d at 1276, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
112. Id. at 841, 799 P.2d at 1278, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
113. Id. The referenced public policy is summarized by the court:
[C]osts of compliance must be interpreted as "damages" in the environmental
context, because to hold otherwise would make insurance coverage hinge on the
"mere fortuity" of the way in which government agencies seek to enforce
cleanup requirements, would unreasonably constrain the agencies' choice of
cleanup mechanisms, and would introduce substantial inefficiency into the
cleanup process.
Id. at 840-41, 799 P.2d at 1278, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 845. See supra note 95 and accompa-
nying text.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, whose reasoning was based on policy language in-
terpretation, strayed into public policy in the same area. "It is obviously the better public
policy to encourage responsible parties to take immediate action themselves to mitigate
and remedy groundwater contamination rather than await a state operated clean up ef-
fort at a later date." Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d
175, 182 (1990).
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B. Policy Considerations
While the decision may not have been policy-based, its, effect
clearly is. Who pays for environmental cleanup is a tough, persistent
question. It boils down to economics. The real question, perhaps, is
who best can bear the inordinate cost of cleanup with the least im-
pact on our society. The bills for environmental cleanup are paid by
government agencies (with tax dollars), by "responsible parties"
(usually corporate polluters) and by insurers.
For the short term, at least, the decision to place a large responsi-
bility on insurance companies may be the least burdensome, for sev-
eral reasons. First, by the very nature of their business, insurers are
better able than either taxpayers or corporations to accept the risk
without severe adverse effects. Certainly, both taxpayers and corpo-
rations will pay the price for increased risk to insurers, but instead of
a lump sum, the cost will be spread over years of premium
payments.
Second, insurers' liability is limited to the face value of the policy.
There are no limits on a corporation's liability except exhaustion of
its assets. Even if unlimited liability seems like just retribution for
polluters, driving corporations out of business is not in society's best
interest. Bankrupt companies cease to be employers, taxpayers and
supporters of charitable concerns. They adversely affect creditors,
other businesses and consumers. Society as a whole suffers a detri-
ment from failing businesses, just as society suffers from the effects
of widespread pollution.
However, several policy considerations argue against imposition of
the pollution burden on insurers. One, alluded to above, is the deter-
rence notion, that polluters who pay for their own sins will be more
careful next time. This is the moral hazard argument that those with
insurance take fewer precautions. 14 Indeed, during the insurance
crisis of the mid-1980s, companies which became self-insured evi-
dently became far more safety-conscious.115
114. Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 39 (1985). Cooter observes:
The tension that sometimes arises between efficient risk bearing and efficient
precaution can occur in insurance contracts as well. The insurer can more effi-
ciently spread risk, but the insured party can more efficiently take precautions
against that risk. Insurance thus undermines the incentives of the policyholde"
to take precaution against the insured event.
Id.
115. "Once self-insured, companies often become safety zealots. The incentive:
fear of lawsuits they will have to absorb directly." Schmitz, Shapiro & Waldman, The
Insurers, however, combat moral hazard by building into policies
several means of promoting loss avoidance. One method is use of
deductibles. The insured, who must pay a portion of the loss, is thus
aligned with the insurer by a common interest in loss avoidance. An-
other way insurers induce greater caution in insureds is by excluding
coverage for particularly high risks.' 16
Another consideration for not holding insurers liable is that dam-
ages usually will be limited to the value of the insured property. En-
vironmental cleanup, however, far exceeds the pre-contamination
market value of property." 7 Thus, in a normal insurance scheme,
polluted property would be abandoned. The insurer would reimburse
up to market value, not the unexpected (and uncharged for) cost of
remediation exceeding value."1 Cleanup of our natural resources,
however, is a valuable, indeed essential, goal itself. 'Society literally
cannot survive unlimited toxic waste and contaminated water."'
Thus, "CERCLA liability is essentially a societally based liability,
not a market one.'1 20
Finally, another reason to question placing the pollution burden on
insurers is the profound uncertainty of environmental liability. Insur-
ers are unable to predict and properly assess premiums for unknown
and unknowable environmental risks. For example, retroactive strict
liability imposed by CERCLA121 means hazardous waste site gener-
ators, transporters, owners and operators are liable, regardless of
when waste was deposited or whether their actions were considered
reasonable at the time. 22
Thus, the impact of AIU is not on future pollution liability cover-
age. Since insurers did not wait for the California Supreme Court's
decision to exclude almost all pollution coverage in current liability
policies,123 the point is moot. However, AIU will affect California
Surge in Self-Insurance, 111 NEWSWEEK 74 (March 7, 1988).
116. Environmental Liability, supra note 102, at 951-52. Insurers' reaction to es-
calating losses evidently has had a desired effect on their insureds.
'The crisis in liability insurance has made risk management a main concern for
top corporate decision-makers,' says Robert H. Malott, chairman of FMC
Corp. [real party in interest in AIU .... Like other sophisticated corpora-
tions, FMC uses 'preventive law' programs to reduce the company's exposure
to suits. Such programs can include a so-called legal audit of a corporation's
businesses, identifying products, services, or manufacturing operations that
could trigger lawsuits, and either cleaning them up or scrapping them.
Brody, When Products Turn into Liabilities, 113 FORTUNE 20, 23-24.
117. Mountainspring, Insurance Coverage of CERCLA Response Costs: The Lim-
its of "Damages" in Comprehensive General Liability Policies, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755,
796 (1989) [hereinafter Insurance Coverage].
118. Id.
119. Federal Environmental Programs, supra note 1.
120. Insurance Coverage, supra note 117, at 796.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
122. Environmental Liability, supra note 102, at 957-58.
123. Environmental Liability, supra note 102, at 944 n.8.
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courts' decisions about coverage under past CGL policies for existing
and yet-to-be-discovered pollution.
V. CONCLUSION
In a decision worth millions of dollars to comprehensive general
liability insurance policyholders, the California Supreme Court held
insurers are obligated to cover environmental response costs and
costs of compliance with injunctions incurred pursuant to CERCLA
and state and federal hazardous waste violations. AIU Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court resolved a one-one split in California courts of ap-
peal and left no doubt about interpretation of standard-form CGL
policies.
The court grounded its decision in case law and statutes, particu-
larly principles of contract interpretation. The justices refused to ac-
knowledge public policy as a basis for their analysis. Yet, given the
magnitude of this life-threatening problem and the phenomenal cost
of cleanup, the court made an important policy-based decision by
including insurers in the allocation of expenses for toxic waste
cleanup. By emphasizing the reasonable expectations of an insured,
even if the insured is a sophisticated conglomerate like FMC, the
court did make policy-oriented judgments. Instead of excusing insur-
ers from the bargain they unknowingly made to cover unthought-of
property damage, the California Supreme Court chose to marshall
all resources to combat pollution.
In its digression into the realm of policy, the court refused to let
insurers off on the technicality of non-liability for the insured's own
expenses to mitigate damages and decrease the cost of remediation.
The court thus assured companies some resources and the incentive
to initiate cleanup, thereby meeting the goal of efficient, timely re-
sponse to this crucial problem. The court pointed out that Congress
and the California Legislature had already made the public policy
determinations by providing express statutory permission for insur-
ance against government-required cleanup. Appropriately, the court
- supported legislative policy with its decision in AIU.
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